were discussing how to manage better the extensive correspondence and telephone conversations on safety issues among the three BW laboratories, the idea of a conference emerged as a collective thought. The idea was quickly ratified by the safety directors at the three BW installations as the perfect vehicle for sharing safety information. Due to the nature of the work conducted at the BW laboratories, papers presented at the conference would have to be cleared in advance by security officers and attendance would be restricted to persons with secret clearances. These restrictions were considered at the time a small burden in contrast to the enormous benefit that would be gained from sharing common experiences and collaboratively reolving important safety problems.
Orin T. Miller discussed bacteriological cabinet systems with special reference to Class III cabinetry. The Blickman Company had installed a Class III cabinet system in Building 550 which was to be the "Cabinet of the Future." This innovative design was developed jointly by safety and engineering personnel at Camp Detrick and equipment engineers at the Blickman Company. The Class III cabinet system had two levels. The first level contained a bottommounted freezer, a back-mounted refrigerator, back-and bottom-mounted incubators, animal holding space, two double-door autoclaves, and an area where two people could work facing each other. The second level provided additional animal holding space. The first and second levels were connected with service elevators. Air entering the Class III cabinet system was filtered and the exhaust air was both filtered and incinerated. Panels, windows, and adjacent cabinets were joined with interstitial neoprene gaskets and secured with stainless steel bolts and nuts. The Class III system had to meet a standard of leak tightness which was determined by demonstrating no leakage greater than 1 x 10-8 cc per second using a calibrated halide detector when the system was pressurized to 3 in wg using 1% dichlorodifluoromethane gas. Problems with the cabinet system included difficulty in obtaining leak tightness, formation of moisture in the bottom of the incubators, and the long time required to pass materials and animals between the two animal levels.
G. Briggs Phillips made a presentation on aerobiological safety where he discussed containment problems associated with the million-liter test tank, known locally as the "8-Ball." He emphasized the particularly troublesome problems caused by leaking valves and pinhole air leaks in the welds of the 1.5 in mild steel panels. He also spoke about the methods used to aerosolize test microorganisms and the importance of complete decontamination. One of us (RH.K.) discussed safety problems in a production area. The production steps were described by following the growth of a BW agent from a beginning in a test tube, through sequential transfers to larger flasks, and ultimately to a 10,000 liter vessel where the microorganism was then harvested and concentrated by centrifugation. Before work with infectious microorganisms could begin, the complete procedure was thoroughly reviewed, the systems were pressurized and tested for gas leaks, and the procedure was performed numerous times with non-virulent simulants like Serratia marcescens and Bacillus subtilis subsp. niger (BG). Environmental monitoring was conducted using sieve and slit samplers. Other papers presented by Camp Detrick personnel were: "Occupational Illnesses at Camp Detrick" by Dr. Wedum; "Operation of Sewer Sterilization Plants" by Gardner G. Gremillion; "Recent Safety Developments and Problems" by G. Briggs Phillips; "Laboratory Hazards" and "The BW Safety Orientation Program" by Dr. Morton Reitman.
Dr. Howard Moorman, who was the safety director at PBA, discussed the safety organization at PBA and described its functions at the Biological Production and Development Laboratories. Mr. Roger Lerwell, the safety director at DPG, discussed test vehicle decontamination. A presentation titled, "Off-Post Safety Considerations for BW" was made by CDR Robert Holdenreid, the U.S. Public Health Service liaison officer at DPG. In addition, there were informal round table discussions concerning ethylene oxide and formaldehyde decontamination, air sampling techniques, and the use of rubber gloves with Class I and Class III safety cabinets. It was noted that these gloves had a propensity to leak around the area adjacent to the hand rolled bead. There was much concern about this problem because the leaks were difficult to locate and repair in spite of the dielectric test performed on each glove during fabrication.
Back then ...
There was no formal program for the first biological safety conference, but an agenda had been prepared. In typical Army style, a "happy hour" and dinner was held at the Officer's Club. The meeting participants enjoyed the camaraderie of visiting with colleagues and the informal setting that was so suitable for continuing discussions of important issues. Thus traditions were set at this first biological safety conference for a conference with keynote address, a reception, a banquet and a style that encouraged informal discussions among participants.
2nd Biological Safety Conference
The second biological safety conference was held November 14-17, 1955 at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Personnel from the U.S. Army Biological Production and Development Laboratories (PDL) introduced the conference participants to the scope of safety activities they performed at the PBA laboratories. Dr. George Connell discussed the purpose of the laboratories and then reviewed the ecology in the Pine Bluff area. Victor Jones reviewed surface and air sampling methods and results. Charles Kambar discussed the history of biological safety at the laboratories and gave a technical presentation on the neutralization of quaternary ammonium compounds. Thomas McNeilly reviewed industrial safety issues at PBA.
Camp Detrick personnel presented the following papers: "Camp Detrick's Experiences with Agents Introduced at PDL" by Everett Hanel, Jr.; "Development of Bacterial Production Facilities, from 1943 Black Maria* to 1955 at Camp Detrick" by Charles Glick; "Detection of Organisms Recovered During Production of a Biological Warfare Agent at Camp Detrick" by one of us (R.H.K.) Everett Hanel, Jr., Charles Glick, and R.H.K. also presented an exhibit and roundtable discussion on recently developed vinyl plastic ventilated suits and plastic safety items. From DPG, Roger Lerwell reviewed the occupational illnesses that had occurred at the Biological Assessment Laboratories, and CDR Holdenreid showed a movie made under contract by the University of Utah on the ecology and epidemiology of wildlife of the area.
PBA staff lead extensive tours of the production facilities and development laboratories. The tours focused on general safety problems in operating production facilities.
3rd Biological Safety Conference
The third biological safety conference was held June 18-20, 1956 at Dugway Proving Grounds. The majority of papers were given by staff from DPG and emphasized the types of *Black Maria was the first BW research laboratory facility built at Camp Detrick. It was a wooden rectangular structure covered in tar paper. Access was controlled by a security perimeter fence with attached tower where soldiers equipped with Thompson submachine guns maintained constant surveillance. studies carried out at the Biological Assessment Laboratories. Roger Lerwell reviewed the safety program at DPG. L. T. Christian and P. W. Williams gave a presentation on BW aspects offield tests and range controls. Dr. J. Osborne gave a talk on epidemiological aspects ofBW safety. He reported that coyotes (Canis latrans) were very resistant to anthrax, but would harbor Francisella tularensis, the etiological agent of tularemia, for at least 80 days without apparent illness. The common rabbit tick (Haemaphysalis leporispalastris) could carry and transmit tularemia, and Fr. Tularensis could pass through at least one molt. The majority of rodents were susceptible to tularemia and were carriers; one exception was the kangaroo rat (Dipodomys merrlami). Sheep in the Dugway area had antibodies to brucellosis and tularemia. Q fever was uncommon among sheep but found in cattle. Anthrax was found on rare occasions in cattle of Utah. A. E. Western presented data that B. anthracis spores would not kill animals after 21 days in dry soil. However, in moist soil, such as the salt flats, survival persisted beyond three years. He postulated that salts and other chemicals in the soil enhanced the infectivity of Bacillus anthracis spores. Dr. A. Andersen, also from DPG, described his first attempt to make an air sampler that could be used to determine the number of microbial particles and the particle size of recovered microorganisms. He combined the Fort Detrick sieve sampler into a stacked array. Each stage had a perforated plate with holes of constant size. The hole diameter varied with each stage making it possible to both count and size microbial particles. The Andersen Sampler is used worldwide to this day as a reference sampler.
Dr. J. C. Spendlove reported on the outbreak of psittacosis in employees at a rendering plant in Oregon which resulted in two deaths and 25 persons with elevated titers for psittacosis among the 30 exposed employees. S. marcescens and BG were used as tracer organisms to evaluate whether routine work practices were generating infectious aerosols in the rendering plant. A large number of microorganisms were recovered on agar plates placed 100 feet downwind from the rendering building.
Presentations by Camp Detrick safety personnel included: "Rubber Glove Specifications and Procurement" and "Disinfectant Studies, Ethylene Oxide and Formaldehyde" by Everett Hanel, Jr.; "Ultraviolet Airlocks" and "Ventilated Animal Cage Tops" by Elliott Purlson; and "Animal Cross Infection Studies" by George Bodmer.
Back then ...
The tours were very interesting and to many beyond belief. To the first time visitor Dugway was like the end of the world. In the east distance was measured in blocks, but at Dugway it was miles. : 1957-1963 The biological safety conferences during this period continued to be sponsored by and held at the three collaborating U.S. Army BW laboratories. The conference agendas, however, were planned to include non-classified sessions to enable the broader sharing of biological safety information with safety personnel not associated with the U.S. Army BW programs. Dr. James F. Sullivan, Safety Director at the USDA National Animal Disease Laboratory (NADL) at Ames, Iowa, who attended the fourth biological safety conference, was the first person to participate in a non-classified session. Safety representatives from USDA laboratories attended all conferences held during these transition years.
THE TRANSITION YEARS
4th Biological Safety Conference
The fourth biological safety conference was held April 24-26, 1957 at Fort Detrick. Camp Detrick had been renamed Fort Detrick on February 3, 1956. Dr. Waldemar Kirchheimer, Assistant Director ofIndustrial Health and Safety at Fort Detrick, discussed a collaborative study between New York University and Fort Detrick to use statistical methods to elucidate the causes of laboratory-acquired illnesses and accidents. The results corroborated prior Fort Detrick analyses; there were insufficient data to identify specific causes. The inability to determine the main causes, in spite of excellent cooperation among the staff and the full knowledge that adverse action would never be taken against individuals who would report exposures, was puzzling. Dr. Kirchheimer also informed the participants that negotiations between NYU and Fort Detrick were underway to develop a three week graduate level safety program for all military and civilian supervisory safety personnel. It was expected to start in a year.
Robert Alg reported on a glass Petri plate dropping accident that resulted in two clinical and three subclinical infections with tularemia. A study of this incident changed the type of laboratory glassware used at Fort Detrick. The accident was reenacted (Alg and on of us [M. S.B.] ) by dropping 20 glass Petri dishes containing agar inoculated with S. marcescens. Air samplers recovered the test organism 70 feet away in a hallway downstream. Secondary aerosols were produced when the accident area containing the broken glass plates with agar colonies was sprayed with a quaternary ammonium compound. Comparison studies of glass and plastic plates demonstrated that dropped plastic plates produced less aerosol. Fort Detrick adopted the use of plastic laboratory items and used disinfectant-soaked toweling and flooding action to clean up microbial accidents to reduce the potential for laboratory-acquired illnesses.
5th Biological Safety Conference
The fifth biological safety conference was held at Pine Bluff Arsenal April [21] [22] [23] 1958 . This was the first year the USDA, Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory was represented at the conference. It was also the first conference where Charles Glick discussed shipment of biological agents and diagnostic samples.
One of us (R.H.K.) reviewed a project to isolate Mycobacterium tuberculosis during autopsies at the University of Tennessee Medical Center. Pictures that were taken during the autopsies graphically showed the methods used in the attempted isolation. Because several conference participants were absent during the scheduled presentation, Dr.Wedum asked R.H.K. to repeat the presentation after dinner. The content was lost by half the audience because they left the room before the presentation was over. The sixth biological safety conference was held September 13-16, 1960 at Fort Detrick. For the first time, brief abstracts were assembled and distributed to all attendees. Thirty-one papers were presented, and there were tours of laboratories to illustrate the latest improvements in personnel protection. The conference also closed with a "wrap-up" session to plan the site, dates and subjects for the next conference. This started the tradition for having a business meeting.
Robert Alg, now Safety Director at DPG, discussed radiological field operations. Zeniff Cox briefed the attendees on safe field test procedures for chemical and biological warfare operations, a challenging task in the absence of accepted operational standards. Morris Levins reviewed biological operations at DPG's Baker Laboratory in support offield operations. Dr. Jack Palmer discussed wildlife studies and general ecology at Dugway, and raised concern about the impact of an accidental release from the laboratory.
Dr. Moorman reviewed agent illnesses, the complexity of safety operations at PBA and the use of quaternary ammonium compounds for inactivating production agents. Victor Jones reviewed agent surveillance and monitoring techniques, isolation of low levels of agents from blood samples; detection ofFr. tularensis from laboratory surfaces, and airflow requirements for Class III safety cabinets. Charles Kambar described the development of media for propagation of agents in production quantities and methods used to decontaminate containers after filling with BW agents. He evaluated detection media use for rapid identification of BW agents by medical microbiologists.
Safety personnel at Fort Detrick covered a wide range of subject matter in 13 presentations. Everett Hanel reviewed activities to improve operations by: (I): increasing emphasis on the supervisor's role and responsibility; (2) increasing cooperation with outside agencies and individuals; and (3) diversifying and sharing biological safety data with new Department of Defense organizations, universities, research organizations and private companies; and (4) increasing use of biological safety cabinets. A major breakthrough was reported. The significant reduction in laboratory-acquired illnesses at the Biological Research Laboratories was attributed to improved experimental vaccines.
Briggs Phillips reported on his visits to 111 laboratories in 60 cities in 18 countries in Asia, Australia, Europe, and the United States. Numerous slides of the laboratories and equipment showed that microbiological safety practices in foreign countries were below American standards. Elliott Purlson reviewed the development and use of ventilated personnel suits for handling experimental animals exposed to aerosolized pathogenic microbes. The suit system was intended to reduce operating costs while offering maximum protection for operators compared to the use of Class III cabinet systems. Dr. Wedum analyzed rules, regulations, and basic investigations by the Fort Detrick safety staff on shipment of infectious and toxic materials. These data were very important to all BW organizations as they constantly shipped etiologic agents to each other.
Kenneth Hindman, Industrial Safety Officer, reviewed and illustrated the explosive properties of dried organisms in production operations. One of us (M.S.B.) reported on the use of Beta-propriolactone (BPL) as a gaseous chemical sterilant for aerosol chambers and rooms. Charles Glick reviewed the development of airlocks, dunk tanks, and gas-tight doors for Class III Cabinets. He demonstrated methods of removing infectious microbes from Class III Cabinets. During the 1950s, Fort Detrick safety staff evaluated the aerosol hazard associated with common laboratory procedures using S. marcescens and S. indica vegetative microorganisms, and BG spores. Aerosol hazards of common mycological procedures were evaluated using the highly infectious Coccidiodes immitis. One of us (R.H.K.) was the first to demonstrate that more arthroconida from C. immitis were liberated than the vegetative bacteria. This was an important observation for assessing fungal hazards in the laboratory.
Back then ...
One of us (M.S.B.), while investigating the use of beta-propiolactone(BPL) as a gaseous chemical sterilant for aerosol chambers and rooms, found that experiments do not always work as planned. Sometimes, something very different is found. There was to be a visit ofthe test-tank facilities by U.S. Army top military staff. Because outside personnel would be entering the area, a one-million liter test tank and building, recently painted white, had to be decontaminated. To validate effectiveness, BG spores were placed throughout the area. BPL was aerosolized into the area using a large smoke generator. When M.S.B. and his staff entered the room the next day, much to their surprise and grief, they saw sheets of paint hanging from the test tank and air lines, and strewn across the floor. The metal was "clean as a whistle" as all the paint had been removed. And, yes, the decontamination was 100% effective.
7th Biological Safety Conference
The seventh biological safety conference was held September 12-14, 1961 at Dugway Proving Grounds. Henry Schol evaluated bacterial aerosols produced by breakage of inoculated agar plates and reported isolating production agents from blood specimens. Charles Kambar reported that improvements in Class III cabinets could be obtained by: (l) sealing the autoclave flanges to a safety cabinet with silicone rubber; (2) designing a new seal for shaker shafts exiting penetrations in the cabinet; (3) using 9-in. LD. glove ports for 8-in. gloves; and (4) using a key stock door design. One of us (M.S.B.) described the development, installation, and use of a biological alarm system in laboratory buildings at Fort Detrick and shared the results of a study to determine when fiberglass filters required replacement. Dr.Wedum reviewed the status of: (1) packaging requirements for transportation of etiologic agents; (2) use of a live tularemia vaccine strain as a stimulant; and (3) trends of accident rates at Fort Detrck during the past decade.
Robert Alg discussed the development of immunization cards for Chemical Corps personnel, and modifications of a building adjacent to Baker laboratory for decontamination of test vehicles with steam and formaldehyde. Dr. Paul Nichols from the University of Utah described the development of a fiberglass filter mask for respiratory protection. Zeniff Cox outlined the coordination required during field trials to protect the safety of the pilots, ground crews and the community.
Back then ...
One night a loud and strange noise outside the barracks woke most of the attendees to the DPG Conference. A herd of wild mustangs was running and grazing in the field and scratching their backs on the barracks.
8th Biological Safety Conference
The eighth biological safety conference was held June 11-13, 1963 at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Briggs Phillips discussed an epidemiological approach to laboratory safety using data from surveys conducted at the three BW installations, PIADL and NADL. Theron Green presented data on hazards of pathogenic fungi and the first phase of a study of disinfecting various laboratory surfaces after exposure to the parasitic phase of four fungi. One of us (M.S.B.) spoke about developing gloves for handling monkeys and a one-handed syringe manipulator to reduce self-inoculations. Also discussed were various testing methods for respiratory protective masks. Henry Schol discussed antibacterial quaternary ammonium compounds and inactivation of a toxin with alkali solutions. Paul Williams reviewed the conversion of a section of Baker laboratory (DPG) into a ventilated-suit area.
THE NEW ORDER: 1964-65
The ninth and tenth biological safety conferences were the vanguard conferences for growth in the number of participating organizations and for openness in sharing biological safety information and experiences. More than twice the number of federal agencies were represented at these conferences than were represented in earlier years. 1964 was the first year that the federal government's two major health and biomedical research agencies, the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), were represented. Table 1 identifies the first year each participating organization was represented at one of the first ten biological safety conferences. The marked increase in participation in 1964 and 1965 was due in large part to two significant initiatives at that time. First, the conference presentations no longer contained classified material eliminating the previous restrictions on the sharing of information. Second, there was a genuine effort within the federal government to clear previously classified biological safety studies for open literature publication. It was known that this abundance of information would be available at the conferences.
9th Biological Safety Conference
The ninth biological safety conference was held August 18-20, 1964 at the National Animal Disease Laboratory, Ames, Iowa. It was the first time the conference was held at a government installation not associated with the BW program.
Presentations by NADL personnel included Joseph Songer's report on methods to test air filter systems, Donald Braymen's description of methods used to monitor sewage decontamination, and Dr. A. C. Pier's listing of animal dermatophytes transmissible to man. From Fort Detrick, Everett Hanel discussed laboratory-acquired mycotic infections, Gardner Gremillion described development and use of animal cages, and Theron Green talked about cross-infection studies using Macaca mulatta and various pathogenic agents, LJC James Yatso described monkey tuberculosis and chimpanzee hepatitis surveillance programs, and Charles Glick discussed the use of ventilated suits. Dr. Charles W. Beard, a former Fort Detrick employee, and later at the Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin, described modifications to the Henderson Apparatus used for aerosol exposure of large and small animals.
From the PIADL, Dr. G. E. Cottral described the use of Newcastle disease virus and Escherichia Coli T3 bacteriophage to test laboratory exhaust air filters. A highlight of the conference was data presented by Dr. Jack Hyde, Safety Officer of PIADL, who demonstrated that foot and mouth disease virus could travel considerable distances by airflows and infect steers in another area of the building. Later, it was shown that the pressure differentials between zones had to be maintained to prevent transmission. From NADL, Joseph Songer talked about the effect of relative humidity on the survival of some airborne viruses; Dr. Sullivan discussed temperature effects in ethylene oxide sterilization .of animal pathogens; and Donald Braymen described chemical disinfection of soil following contamination with aerobic and anaerobic organisms. From PBA, O. S. Robinson discussed the many problems associated with dried agents including the monitoring the waste and its effect on the Arkansas River. Dr. D. J. Giron gave a presentation on decontamination problems related to the use of infectious agents in space cabin simulators at Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. At this conference, a formal Planning Committee was established for the first time to plan for the next conference.
CONCLUSIONS
What started as informal discussions among three BW installations to provide insight into the many problems faced by safety officers in a day's work, grew over ten years to include representatives from all federal agencies that sponsored and conducted research with pathogenic microorganisms. These biosafety officers were the pioneers who tested programs and conducted innovative experiments that required the foresight and wisdom of program managers who sanctioned research endeavors without an assured outcome. To be adventurous was an asset. As one reviews the list of topics covered during the first decade ofthe biological safety conferences, it is evident that much progress in the emerging discipline of biosafety was made. Table II lists selected publications by these early pioneers on subjects that were first presented at one of the first ten biological safety conferences. These contributions have stood the test of time because they elucidated the basic principles of our profession.
During this entire period, Dr. Arnold G. Wedum, the "Father of Microbiological Safety," provided the wisdom and energy on which to build a new safety discipline. He was an advocate for the biological safety conferences and encouraged all biosafety professionals from the interested organizations to attend and participate in them. He understood that this conference would broaden a participant's knowledge and establish valuable avenues of communication with knowledgeable colleagues. It was a very exciting time for biological safety officers and we are proud to have been participants. Not least because these informal meetings were the training grounds for our future leaders (see Table III 1955 -1965 
